The Analysis Approach of Trade Costs

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1. Introduction

As traditional trade barriers have plunged, concentration has centralized on other costs of international trade. Trade facilitation was one of the four new assertions raised at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Singapore Ministerial meeting in 1996, and is now explicitly encompassed in the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. In the 2001 Shanghai Accord, members of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) endeavored to assuage their trade costs by five per cent between 2002 and 2006 and then agreed on a further five per cent cut between 2006 and 2010. The bilateral trade agreements which have proliferated since the turn of the century always comprise trade facilitation measures. National policymakers and international negotiators concentrate on definite measures that self-evidently alleviate trade costs; WTO Articles ascribe guidelines, and regional arrangements such as the European Union (EU), Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or APEC assay to coordinate trade facilitation among their members.

Approximation of trade costs is imperative. Accessions on targets, such as APEC goals of reducing trade costs by five per cent, are anachronistic without benchmarks. Trade facilitation (TF) is arduous to describe because the impediments to trade are asymmetric, which makes it complex to measure. Thus, it is cumbersome to ascertain the relative implication of diverse constituents of trade facilitation or to analyze suppositions about why trade costs mutate across countries or across commodities. Empirical work on trade costs by economists came out of studies on the border effect and on the impact of trade cost components on trade flows, which highlighted the amplitude of trade costs and the deflection across countries, but direct measurement of trade costs persist in its conception.
The presence of a substantial border effect was highlighted by McCallum (1996), who illustrated that Canadian provinces traded far more with each other than with US states despite the relatively open border and minimal formal trade barriers. Consequent endeavors to appraise the border effect came up with very large numbers. Engel and Rogers (1996) assessed that the border added the equivalent of 75,000 miles to the economic distance between two North American cities, and in a methodologically analogous study of US-Japanese trade, Parsley and Wei (2001) computed a border effect equivalent to 43,000 trillion miles.

Limao and Venables (2001) presented that the cost of a standardized freight load from Baltimore deflected substantially depending on the destination port and to a large degree independent of distance. This paper stimulates a literature to determine the sources of the variation in costs and the extent of the impact on trade. The typical appeal is to embed indicators of port efficiency and arduous customs procedures and so forth illustrated from survey data into a gravity model and observe which indicators are related to the size of bilateral trade flows. This literature beseeches the impact of customs procedures or port efficiency on trade rather than assessing the size of the trade costs.

The cost of individual constituents of trade costs, such as customs procedures, or of trading along a specific course can be estimated. The Time Release Study methodology formulated by the World Customs Organization (WCO) or the Time/Cost Transport Route methodology of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) are examples. Such microeconomic measures ascribe valuable information about costs at individual border crossing points or along particular transport corridors, but they cannot be summarized to contrast aggregate trade costs across countries. What is expected for policy-relevant economic assertion of trade costs are aggregate measures analogous to average tariffs on manufactured goods or the producer support accounts exercised in agricultural trade negotiations.

Curiosity in measuring trade costs was motivated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). Blending direct and indirect measures from a variety of sources, they assessed ad valorem trade costs in high-income countries to be around 170 per cent a dramatic number when tariffs average fewer than 10 per cent. They chose a very broad definition, measuring all the costs from when a good leaves the producer to when the final consumer purchases it. In the trade facilitation (TF) context, a more admissible measure would constitute only the costs of international trade, overlooking transport and retail costs which would be incurred in a domestic transaction.

A current literature on trade costs converges on the crevice between the Free-On-Board (FOB) value of a traded good at the point of export and the Cost-Insurance-Freight (CIF) value of the same good when it enters the importing country as the highest available aggregate measure of trade costs. The CIF-FOB gap is often accredited to as transport costs, but its size is affected by policies and procedures which broaden the gap directly or which annex to it circumstantially, for example, by causing hiatuses which amplify dwell-time at the port. Behind-the-border costs such as
poor transport infrastructure can cause apprehensions, which discourage just-in-time dispensation and hence increase average demurrage costs. Thus, the CIF-FOB gap is a broader measure than freight rates quoted by air or sea carriers and customs clearance costs; and its cross-country deflection envisions policy-responsive variables as well as distance and the commodity composition of trade.

The practical affliction in banding CIF-FOB gap measures is accumulating coherent data. The volume of exports from country i to country j must be equivalent to the volume of imports by j from i, but in practice bilateral trade flows as reported by the importing and exporting countries (the so-called mirror statistics) deflect, and to a degree that makes them futile for constituting CIF-FOB gap measures of trade costs. The predicament can be persevered by using data from countries whose trade data report both the CIF and FOB values of imports. In these datasets, the two values apply to equivalent trade flows. Furthermore, such data are only amassed and made practicable by a handful of countries, raising a question of whether the results are formidable to the choice of data source.

This paper adds to the trade costs literature by imparting authentication on the CIF-FOB gap from several national datasets to question whether the determinations of existing studies are robust across countries. The first section ascribes background on the evolution of economists’ research on trade costs, accentuating that, despite their dramatic effects, headline numbers like 75,000 miles or 170 per cent are deficient measures of the border effect or of trade costs. The second section probes into the CIF-FOB measure, magnifying its strengths and weaknesses, and why it has been arduous to exercise. The third section demonstrates evidences on trade costs using customs level CIF-FOB data from Australia, Brazil, Chile and the USA. The fourth section extracts conclusions.

2. The Effect and Trade Costs
The border effect was highlighted by McCallum (1995) who showed that Canadian provinces trade much more with other provinces than with US states despite the analogies of culture and institutions and the relatively open border. The timing was hardly coincidental; with the conception of the EU single market in 1992, signature of NAFTA in 1993 and accomplishment of the Uruguay Round in 1994, traditional trade barriers, i.e., tariff and non-tariff barriers such as quantitative constraints, were becoming negligible, at least for OECD countries. McCallum ascertained that even with trade liberalization and in the nonexistence of major cultural, linguistic or other differences between two trading nations, home bias in trade persisted to be substantial. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) listed the border effect as one of the six major puzzles in international economics.

How large is the border effect? The size of the border effect observed through price digressions rather than trade flows has been highlighted by Engel and Rogers (1996), who acknowledged that crossing the US-Canada border is equivalent to adding 75,000 miles to a trade transaction. This study is much cited and the headline figure is much
quoted, but the method is blemished. An austere analogy of price variability across cities pair in the same country and cities pairs located on different sides of the US–Canadian border fails to monitor for the heterogeneity of price movements in order to segregate the border treatment (Tesar and Gorodnichenko, 2009).

The border effect can be clarified by trade barriers (as in traditional trade policy analysis), transaction costs associated with crossing borders (trade costs), and the extensibility of replacement between domestic and foreign goods. The first two ascertain the wedge between the price paid by buyers and sellers of imported goods, and the third ascertains the impact of the price wedge on the amount imported. employing a gravity model to a cross-section of OECD countries, Evans (2003) assessed the causative composition of the border effect to be high elasticity of substitution 20 per cent, trade barriers 34 per cent, and trade costs 46 per cent; the last is the biggest source of the border effect. In sum, the border effect endures and there is some confirmation that trades costs are a considerable cause, but this literature assigns no measure of the size of trade costs.

The more novel gravity model literature, following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), has approved that bilateral trade flows depend not only on distance and mass but also on country-specific trade resistance terms, e.g., if a country has doctrines or institutions inimical to trade its bilateral trade, flows will be smaller, or if it assigns preferential aperture to goods from one trading partner that could influence trade with all partners. The econometric justification has been to use in country fixed effects in cross-sectional models, and Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) castigate dereliction to do so as the gold-medal error in gravity-based studies. Baldwin and Taglioni make the point that, unlike in Newtonian physics where gravitational pull between i and j is determined by mass and distance doubled by a constant term,

$$\text{gravity}_{pq} = g(\frac{\text{mass}_p, \text{mass}_q}{\text{distance}_{pq}})$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

in international trade, the relationship between mass, distance and trade are a ‘gravitational un-constant’. The un-constant depends on the degree of trade resistance, which is parallel to the border effect:

$$\text{trade}_{pq} = TR(\frac{\text{GDP}_p, \text{GDP}_d}{\text{distance}_{pq}})$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where TR is a variable which depends upon features of each economy, such as the height of multilateral and preferential trade barriers, and upon shared constituents such as a common language, contiguity, membership in a free trade area or a common currency. Baldwin and Taglioni sometimes refered to the ‘gravitational un-constant’ as trade costs, but it is not an exerted, single quantifiable measure of trade costs.

The large variation in trade costs across countries was highlighted by Limao and Venables (2001). They found that the variation in the cost of shipping a conventional container from Baltimore was associated with perception-based indices of port
efficiency in the destination country. Clark Dollar and Micco (2004), using US Department of Transportation data on maritime transport costs between Latin American and US ports, found a parallel affiliation between transport costs and port proficiency in Latin America, and accentuated that “port efficiency” is related to corruption and crime as well as physical infrastructure. Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003) incorporate importing-country-specific indicators of four TF components (port infrastructure, customs clearance, regulatory efficiency and e-business) in a gravity model of trade among APEC countries and establish that all four indicators influence on bilateral trade flows, but simulating the effect on trade if the countries with highest trade costs appeal the APEC average denotes that port efficiency has the biggest impact, ensued by regulatory reform. These indirect measures of trade costs represent the criticalness of components of trade costs for trade flows, but not absolute. Without meticulous specification of trade costs, incorporating multilateral resistance, the heterogeneity of trade costs are not completely apprehended, and the estimated effect of other included variables will be biased. In sum, we cannot assent that port infrastructure is more important than regulatory efficiency let alone measure their impact.

In the first major endeavor to calibrate trade costs in aggregate, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) brought together a amalgamation of direct and indirect evidences to constitute appraises of the cost of getting a good from the point of production to a final consumer in another country. Thus, their description is much broader than the normal emphasis on the difference between the costs of international and domestic trade and their measure is a hybrid in which some constituents are very complex estimates. In comparable vein, Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2009) fabricate a measure of the multilateral resistance terms, TR in Eq. (2), which furnishes a guide to adaptations in trade costs over time. This too is a sizable measure of trade costs, which encompasses domestic trade costs in the importing country.

However the literature explicated in this section has been instrumental in highlighting the consequence of trade costs, it is less useful in allowing measures of trade costs. The different gravity model exercises assess the impact of components of trade costs on trade, rather than assessing the size of trade costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) and the various papers by Novy and associates (see reference list) bestow numerical estimates of trade costs, but these are inventively broad. Microeconomic measures such as WCO trade release studies are more definite and concretely based, but centralizing on a lone element of trade costs (in the WCO case, the costs of clearing customs) they are partial. What is constrained for more meticulous assertion of the impact of trade costs and to determine policy targets such as analysis the APEC goal of a 5 per cent abridgement in trade costs are an affirmed total measure of trade costs cogitated as the difference between the costs of domestic and international transactions.

3. The CIF-FOB Gap Measure of Trade Costs
The asymmetry between the costs of international and domestic trade has an operational counterpart in the breach between the FOB value of a traded good on arrival at the point of export and the CIF value of the same good when it debarks the importing country. The FOB value appraises the cost of delivering a good to a domestic wholesaler, while the CIF value is coarsely identical to the cost of obtaining a domestic good at the factory door or farm gate. The difference between the FOB and CIF value can be analyzed as the difference between the costs of domestic and international trade.

However sometimes ascribed to as transport costs, e.g. in the motivational survey by Hummels (2007), the CIF-FOB gap will inundate the shipping cost if destitute infrastructure or other factors augment dwell times at the port of exit or entry. Additionally, freight rates themselves are not autonomous of the policy environment, being higher when there is less competition due to cartel accessions among shipping companies or in the nonexistence of inter-governmental open skies agreements. Thus, it is not alarming that there are large dissimilarities in the CIF-FOB gaps which are only in part interpreted by exogenous components such as geography or commodity characteristics, and that the CIF-FOB gap can be lessened by TF policies.

Assessing trade costs by the CIF-FOB gap does not enable an austere concordance between reduced trade costs and trade facilitation. Some constituents of trade facilitation cannot be computed in ad valorem terms even in principle and are not picked up by the CIF-FOB gap. A contraction in technical barriers to trade (TBTs), for instance, may augment the quantity of trade without affecting the CIF-FOB gap. The approach in the WTO under the TBT Agreement is on a case by case basis to determine detrimental TBTs rather than to derive total measures of the size of TBTs. The current approach to TF in WTO negotiations is to reach agreement on procedures rather than to set quantitative targets. Even in this context, CIF-FOB measures can help to determine which trading nations should be seen as best practice. When trade negotiations embody quantitative TF targets, such as the APEC target of a 5 per cent reduction in trade costs over five years, measurement by an agreed yardstick is indispensable.

As with all of the measures discussed in this paper, the CIF-FOB gap encapsulates only the financial side of trade costs, not the time costs of international trade, which are decisive for goods such as perishables or fashion items. Even though time is not overtly addressed, it affects the CIF-FOB gap circuitously and may bias some of the results and interpretations. Some goods are more time-sensitive than others, and the time dimension is intimately associated to the choice of mode, particularly air versus sea transport, which has denotations for appraising trade costs from data disaggregated by commodity and mode. The time premium may not be continual; when demand is capricious, air may be chosen because it assents a faster response to price changes (Hummels and Schaur, 2009). Time may also interact with other variables related to cost, e.g. the time advantage of air is more acknowledged over longer distances. In aggregate, although time is overlooked in constructing the trade costs measure, it cannot be ignored in its assertion and interpretation.
Hummels (2007) highlighted the size of the CIF-FOB gap, which was 7–11 per cent of import value in New Zealand between 1963 and 1997 and 4–8 per cent in the USA between 1974 and 2004, i.e. much higher than the average ad valorem tariffs by the end of the period encased. The relative constancy of these measures in a period when we might apprehend transport and other trade costs to have fallen may be in part due to composition bias related to changes in mode of transport. The share of international trade using air rather than sea transport has increased as the relative cost of air freight fell. At the margin, goods with the highest value to weight ratio shift from sea to air, and the change in composition could lead to average trade costs associated with maritime trade increasing even if costs for every individual shipment have fallen, while average costs associated with airborne trade might also increase because the average weight/value of air freight has risen. Average trade costs by both modes of transport might increase and overall average trade costs therefore increase, even though the costs for any shipment by air or by sea have fallen.

The choice of countries and time periods in Hummels’s paper (2007) envisions the focal limitation of using the CIF-FOB gap, which is data availability. The volume of any import of a good by country p from country q is equivalent to country q’s export of the good to country p, and the CIF import value of that trade flow must inundate fob export values because they incorporate transport, insurance and other costs. Furthermore, reported trade flows by importing and exporting countries never equalize, even among countries with high reporting standards such as the OECD countries, and the sign of the CIF-FOB gap is often negative. The difference between the mirror statistics can be very large across insufficiently monitored borders or where incentives to smuggle endure. Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) have displayed that the asymmetries between matched partner trade statistics are so large and anachronistic that they are impractical for the study of trade costs. Thus, any study of trade costs using the CIF-FOB gap must be based on data collected at a common source, where the volume of each good reported in the CIF and FOB total is equivalent. Applicable CIF-FOB data are now appropriate for the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Chile, and other Latin American countries.

Much of the analytical work has used the US data, which are available at chronicled disaggregation levels (10 digit HS) and for different ports. Anatomizing the choice of mode is, however, complex with US data because the choices constitute not just sea and air but also rail or road, possibly even from a Canadian or Mexican port. Thus many US studies deem only maritime shipping, although the scrutiny should address the preceding decision about which imports enter the USA by sea rather than by air or by land.

The selection of mode is an issue for all countries’ trade data, but less so for Australia or New Zealand, where land is not an option. Pomfret and Sourdin (2008; 2009) have assayed the Australian data, which ascribes matched CIF and FOB HS 6-digit data for years since 1990, i.e., a justly fine aggregation level distinguishing over 5,000 “commodities”. Average trade costs, computed by the CIF-FOB gap, fell
considerably from 8.0 per cent in 1990 to 4.9 per cent in 2007. In 2007, they were higher than the average applied tariff.

In the Australian data, the CIF-FOB gap diffracts significantly across trading partners. Pomfret and Sourdin (2008) find that, although distance and commodity features are substantial determinants of trade costs, a large unexplained alteration prevails after these have been administered for. early consequences using a measure of corruption (the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index) admonish that poor institutions amplify trade costs, but that the pattern of increases is commodity definite and the results are stronger for air transport. This is coherent with the supposition that time-sensitive goods are more responsive to high trade costs, and also insinuates that the selection of mode is endogenous.

Controlling for distance and commodity characteristics and alienating by mode of transport, Australian trade costs fell considerably over the period 1990–2007, but not equivalently for all trading partners. Trade costs of ASEAN countries fell faster than global trade costs in the 1990s, when those countries insinuated concerted trade facilitation steps such as regularized customs forms and single windows for border clearance; the pattern within ASEAN was of convergence to the group’s best practice, Singapore (Pomfret and Sourdin, 2009).

The conclusions are that trade costs deflect across countries and are ascertained by a variety of factors. These constitute geography and comparative advantages, which lead to differing commodity composition of trade, but the determinants also contain customs arrangements, port efficiency and other infrastructure or logistical arrangements that are assenting to change. Evidence of reduction in trade costs by policy measures can be found in ASEAN’s experience during the 1990s. There may, however, be reservations about the haleness of approximations based on countries’ trade with Australia, and the next section bequeaths evidences from a wider sample of countries.

4. Widening the Database
This section reports the CIF-FOB gap measure of trade costs employing customs data from Australia, Brazil, Chile and the USA for 2000 to 2011. We demonstrate the raw measures for each country, both in total (Table 1) and broken down by trading partner (Table 2). The first evinces the level of trade costs in each of the four importing countries, while the second endows a comparable depiction of trade costs associated with exports from all countries in the world. Conclusively, we analyze estimates of trade costs which abstract from the impact of exporter and commodity characteristics (Table 3). Table 1 demonstrates the raw CIF-FOB measures of trade costs. In all two countries, trade costs degenerated considerably between 2000 and 2011.

Table 1: Average Trade Costs (CIF-FOB gap), Indian and USA Imports, 2000–2011.

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As per previous study of four countries, the USA begins with the lowest trade costs, 5.0 per cent in 2000, and they descend to 3.8 per cent in 2011. Australia and Brazil have the largest declines in trade costs, and the extents are very akin; as per the reference report. Also India begins with the apex trade costs, 9.3 per cent, and they fall to 7.8 per cent. Disaggregating by the two pivotal analyzed modes of transport, the decline in trade costs in the USA and Australia were directed by falling trade costs concurred with airborne trade, while in Brazil and Chile the trade costs associated with air hardly changed and the aggregate decline in trade costs was due to lower costs associated with maritime trade.

The numbers in Table 1 demonstrate a presumable picture of the trade costs associated with the four countries’ imports over the period anatomized, and assent interesting analogies. Some caveats are, however, in order. albeit the denotations of CIF and FOB are comprehensive, approximation by the national customs services may not be proportioned in detail. The coverage of the four datasets contrasts insofar as land transport is not constituted in our US data and there may be differences in coverage of parcel post or of some destinations (e.g. military or diplomatic missions overseas or international organisations). Our apprehension is that these adaptations are concise, given that the ample majority of observations are imports from commonly determined trading partners debarking by sea or air, but we do not test this.

The data from each importing country approximates trade costs for all other countries of the world. For each of the four datasets, the importing country’s

Table 2: Average Previous Trade Costs by Country. (Source: Online).
Table 3: Previous Ad valorem trade costs, adjusted for exporter-commodity effects, 1990–2008.
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Contribution to trade costs and the approximation actions of the importing country are coherent, so measures of the trade costs of each trading partner do not confront the feasible biases explicated in the former paragraph. Table 2 portrays the trade costs associated with exporting in 2008.

Table 2 highlights the cross-country deflection in trade costs. The range of trade costs are large, although the intense connotations incline to be countries with small trade flows where misreporting of individual transactions may be a problem. The size
of trade costs does not depend plainly on geographical variables such as distance or landlockedness. Pomfret and Sourdin (2008) evince that distance and commodity characteristics account part, but far from all, of the variation in trade costs in the Australian data.

The rankings of high and low trade cost countries are akin in each dataset. Table 2 annotates the CIF-FOB gaps connected with imports from the four data-source countries and thirteen other countries (other G8 countries, two large Latin American and four large Asian trading nations) in 2008. As shown in Table 1, the trade costs are generally lower on exports to the USA and higher on exports to Chile. There are some apparent asymmetries in the rankings associated with geography, e.g. Canadian and Mexican exports to the USA have lower trade costs than Canadian and Mexican exports to the South American countries or Australia. Some other anomalies are presumably associated with bickering commodity composition, e.g. the difference between trade costs associated with Chilean exports to the USA and to Australia or Brazil. Nevertheless, there are consistent patterns: Singapore and the UK is among the partners with the lowest trade costs using any of the four countries’ data, and Russia, China and Indonesia are among those with the highest. The rankings from the four countries’ import data are assuredly connected, and the rank correlation is competent. The conclusion is that any of the four countries’ import data assign a conceivably coherent measure of their trading partners’ trade costs, although there is need to be cautious in consenting for specifics of geography such as contiguity or of commodity compilation.

Trade costs differ for diverse bilateral trade flows. The above measures designate considerable differences across the four importing countries in summative and by mode and over time, as well as large variations in the trade costs of exporting countries across the world. Some of the difference is due to geographical factors (distance, landlockedness, ice-free natural harbours, etc.) and some follow from a country’s proportional advantage (e.g. the ad valorem trade costs associated with Chilean exports of copper will be higher than trade costs for Brazilian exports of swimsuits).

To abstract from geography and commodity characteristics, we exert a fixed effects model to analyse trade costs using disaggregated import data from Australia, Brazil, Chile and the USA for 1990 to 2008. The dependent variable is

\[
\frac{CIF_{p,q,k} - FOB_{p,q,k}}{FOB_{p,q,k}}
\]

for imports by country p of a commodity k (i.e. goods in a HS 6-digit category) from a trading partner j. Since each dataset determines about 200 trading partners, with over 5,000 commodities and 19 years, there could be 20 million connotations. The authentic archetypal sizes are as follow:

- Australia 2,222,514 observations, of which sea 1,172,364 and air 1,071,250.
- Brazil 1,527,272 observations, of which sea 729,942, air 672,720, road 97,238, post 22,967, train 1,787, fixed installation 70, river 1,433 and lake 33.
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- Chile 1,384,431 observations, of which sea 618,773, air 572,575, road 195,877, post 1,299, train 533, fixed installation 81, river 54 and lake 39.
- USA 2,987,418 observations, of which sea 1,475,011 and air 1,531,407.

Thus, the number of commodity-country observations alters from 1.5 to 3.0 million.

The consequences of the regressions with exporting country and commodity fixed effects are accounted in Table 3. The pivotal contrast between Tables 1 and 3 is that, once allowance is made for exporter-commodity fixed effects, trade costs are higher by air than by sea (Fig. 2). Goods with high value to bulk are shipped by air and the raw ad valorem trade costs are lower for these goods because their value is high. Although, once allocation is fabricated for commodity characteristics, air freight is more exorbitant than maritime freight. It costs more to ship a ton of merchandise by air than by sea; but relative to the value of the goods, the costs of air-freighting a ton of diamonds is much lower than the cost of shipping a ton of coal by sea.

The ranking of the four countries’ trade costs by both the unadjusted ad valorem rates in Table 1 and the adjusted measures in Table 3 is analogous. Chile has the highest trade costs by sea or air, and the USA generically has the lowest trade costs. The exception is the striking drop in Brazil’s adjusted maritime trade costs between 2002 and 2008, when they fell below those of both Australia and the USA. In general, trade costs associated with maritime trade is more similar across the four countries than trade costs associated with air transport. Anecdotal evidence advises that reducing trade costs associated with air freight has much to do with associated services and

![Figure 2: Previous analysis : Adjusted ad valorem Trade Costs, various modes, Australian, Brazilian, Chilean and US Imports, 1990-2008.](image)

Logistics, which can be swiftly upgraded, as perhaps reflected in the Australian data of the 1990s.
Conclusion
The border effect is substantial. Intra-North American trade, as analyzed by McCallum (1995), ascribes the strongest evidence. Even when formal trade barriers have been eliminated and the asymmetry in distance between international and domestic trade can be held consecutive (as in pair-wise comparisons of, say, Ontario-British Columbia and Ontario-California trade), large differences endure between domestic and international trade flows. The inference is that international trade involves larger costs than domestic trade.

Trade costs depend on many things of which, apart from distance-related transport costs, port efficiency and regulatory impedes appear to be most important. However, the evidence on such decompositions is not conclusive. Deriving conclusions from gravity models depend on whether the heterogeneous determinants of the gravity un-constant have been appropriately distinguished before computing the treatment effect. Microeconomic or synthetic measures of trade costs advocate that they are high, e.g. compared to the level of tariffs in high-income countries, but such measures are complex to engender on a consistent aggregate basis that can be compared across countries.

The supreme total measure of trade costs is the CIF-FOB gap. The data expected to fabricate CIF-FOB measures are only feasible for imports into a small number of countries, and the enduring literature illustrates initially on US or Australian data. The US data are the most accounted and encase the largest value of imports, but are appeased by the ubiquity of overland transport and its implication for the choice of mode of transport. The evidence from the Australian data are that trade costs differ considerably across countries, depending in part on distance from trading partners and on the commodity composition of their trade. Although, even after administering for distance and commodity composition, large cross-country alterations endure, some of which are policy-determined and are acquiescent to reduction by trade facilitation measures. The best quantitative authentication of successful trade facilitation is from the ASEAN countries.

In the third section of this paper, we report on data from the USA, Australia, Brazil and Chile to appraise the magnitude to which CIF-FOB gap measure of trade costs are aberrant with respect to the reporting (importing) country. Although there are conversions related to contiguity or differing import bundles, the overall patterns surface to be analogous. The conclusion is that finding about trade costs based on Australian CIF-FOB or US data are presumably to be conceivably robust.

References


